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Abstract:  
Following Isabelle Stengers’ call that the anthropocene should make us feel and 
think differently, this paper focuses on the human task to shift its affective response. 
Since Stengers calls for a new “us” that seeks to participate in an entanglement, I 
propose to explore the material and ontogenetic functions of soil, and specifically 
soil pores, in reimagining a new form of e-co-affectivity. A new e-co-affective 
response would emphasize the usually hidden fluidity and diachronic time of pores, 
and, in doing so, cultivate an epistemic and aesthetic sensitivity, deceleration, 









E-Co-Affectivity Beyond the Anthropocene: Rethinking the Role of Soil to 
Imagine a New ‘Us’ 
 
It is up to us to create a manner of responding, for ourselves but also 
for the innumerable living species that we are dragging into the 
catastrophe, and, despite this “us” only existing virtually, as 




The thick, heavy soil in which we bury our loved ones carries with it deep, affective 
resonance. As a regenerative body, the soil provides a sense of consolation that is 
related, yet very different, from a memorial service. Where memorial services speak 
individual words and invoke distinct memories and affects as related to the unique 
person who is now dead, the soil touches us in a very different affective register, and 
draws us, even in or precisely by its concreteness, toward a wider living community 
of which we are all part.  
The figure of soil offers us the opportunity to investigate the medium, the 
material in-between, the concrete interface where e-co-affectivity lives and 
breathes: it implies a certain place or milieu (hence “eco,” as in the Greek “oikos”) 
and connection to others (hence “co”).2 Central to the concept of affectivity as I see it 
is a complex kind of causal relationship. Instead of seeing affectivity merely in terms 
of the passive effect of a cause, the kind of affectivity I propose puts at its center 
stage the receptive, responsive power of living beings to react to what happens to 
them, which may include their ability to participate in, and shape, how they are 
affected. Thus, this conception of affectivity can be understood as a kind of 
responsiveness or reactivity to the world. My account of affectivity speaks both to 
the ability to be affected and the ability to affect, and the complex relationship 
between the two.3 It recognizes that, on an organic level, living beings become who 
they are through mutual interaction with, and strategic affective responses to, that 
which affects them.4 The hyphenation I use speaks to the fact that the influence of 
place and community cannot be tightly distinguished from the happenings of 
affectivity as such: they are rather aspects of one phenomenon in which they 
 
1 Isabelle Stengers, In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism, (Open 
Humanities Press, 2015), 41. 
2 This article is part of a bigger research project entitled E-Co-Affectivity, which 
thinks through the concrete, living places where affectivity happens. To this end, I 
examine, among other things, photosynthesis in plants, touch and trauma in bird 
feathers, the place-and-time-making qualities of the human placenta, and the medial 
power of human skin. 
3 Cf. Michael Hardt, “Foreword: What Affects Are Good For,” in The Affective Turn: 
Theorizing the Social, ed. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley (Durham-London: 
Duke University Press, 2007) ix.  
4 With thanks to Manuel Vargas for his encouragement and suggestions in 
formulating this definition.  
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participate: e-co-affectivity. Soil provides a localized, material place to engage co-
affectivity; simultaneously, I will argue that this interface is not simply an existing 
material place or surface, but is also a place of ontogenesis: always emerging, 
creative, porous, and fluid.  
Contrasting soil, if only briefly, with the concept of “earth,” may serve to 
explain what my account is trying to do in general and what it seeks to avoid. I seek 
to draw attention to the concrete tangible interface that mediates and co-creates 
affective responses and emerging existences in ever new ways. In this, I resist the 
tendency for certain forms of phenomenology to be overly anthropocentric or to 
overlook the concrete materiality – and related science – of the phenomena that are 
discussed. What I am resisting in choosing soil over earth, is Heidegger’s focus on 
earth and his tendency to grasp earth along the lines of a native ground (“urgrund”) 
or “home”5 specific to human culture, or to grasp it in quasi-mystical terms as the 
obscure ground of our abode: “the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is 
continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing.”6 Such 
renditions of earth are to me both too provincial (in the political and also in the 
anthropocentric sense), and simultaneously too ecstatic and transcendent.7 It is for 
this reason that I focus on soil and its concrete, material, “messy” aspects: in being 
both local and global, in connecting the living and the non-living, and in giving rise 
to a community of co-related beings rather than simply individuated beings, the 
focus on soil rather than earth allows for a different kind of philosophy of affectivity. 
It is an account of affectivity that stands at the interface, seeking to investigate how 
time and place and beings emerge as they are, concretely, being affected together.  
I argue that Haraway’s bifurcation between direct (mimetic) and indirect 
(non-mimetic) sharing of suffering is crucial to conceptualizing e-co-affectivity, 
including her important emphasis on the immanent materiality of sharing suffering, 
as well as the importance of a non-direct form of co-suffering – witnessing suffering 
and paying attention – with significant ethical, evaluative, and practical 
consequences. Still, her account in When Species Meet has shortcomings, in that it 
conceives of direct co-affectivity mostly in the realm of individuated beings 
 
5 In embracing the term “soil” I reject a number of meanings of the term “earth” 
(Erde) as Heidegger formulates them, one of which is “the Heimat that is both given 
and yet chosen, the homeland where one has learned to come into one’s own” (John 
Sallis, foreword to Michel Haar’s The Song of the Earth, xii). Haar distinguishes four 
meanings of “earth” in Heidegger: 1) the obscure ground of our abode (57); 2) that 
which is usually called ‘nature’ (59); 3) the ‘material’ of the work (60); and 4) earth 
as the ‘terrestrial’ (heimatlicher Grund; 61). Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth: 
Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1993). 
6 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In Basic Writings, ed. David 
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins 2008), 174.  
7 In his elucidation of the meaning of earth in Heidegger, Haar writes: “Earth which 
founds art and sustains habitation loses its tangible and purely material or natural 
obviousness. Communicating with the withdrawal of being, it opens a space which, 
escaping historical mutations, abides unscathed” (Haar, The Song of the Earth, 14).  
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interacting with each other in a current time and place; relatedly, her account of 
indirect co-affectivity is oriented too much toward a specific intersubjective and 
ethical setting.  
My argument is that the interface of soil changes the question of access and 
the conceptual schema of co-affectivity. Since the interface of soil is both the local 
underpinning for our lives and deaths (and thus direct and physical) and a theme 
within the global network within which we are connected with all living and non-
living beings (and in that sense indirect) it accesses a broader, different form of 
affectivity. This different form of e-co-affectivity is focused on ontogenesis versus 
being; it is one that fosters a form of regenerative non-cognitive, material affectivity 
that births and buries us all; it is one that in its direct touch still leaves open 
precious pores to contest boundaries between what is and what is not; and, finally, 
it opens up to a temporality and a place beyond that of human temporality, thus 
drawing consolation and hope for a time and place beyond the anthropocene. I will 
argue that a new affective regime beyond the anthropocene can only be brought 
about by both 1) direct interaction with the proximate interface of soil, allowing for 
different kinds of individuations, and 2) indirect interaction with the interface of 
soil, allowing the trope of soil to move us toward a more percolative, inventive, and 
regenerative existence within a broader ecological community. 
 
1. Mimetic and Non-Mimetic Sharing of Suffering in Haraway’s When Species Meet 
 
Human beings’ learning to share other animals’ pain nonmimetically 
is, in my view, an ethical obligation, a practical problem, and an 
ontological opening. Sharing pain promises disclosure, promises 
becoming. The capacity to respond may yet be recognized and 
nourished on this earth (Haraway, When Species Meet).8  
 
At one step removed, compassion provides an opening to mediate and filter how and 
that we are affected, involved, and moved by others’ suffering. Since it is the case 
that we, as humans, all suffer and are undone in grief and mourning, Judith Butler 
has argued that the recognition of suffering and grief in others may allow us to feel a 
shared humanity, a shared “social vulnerability.”9 In Precarious Life, Butler 
addresses the dynamics of being undone in mourning, and how mourning, along 
with desire, underlines that rather than being autonomously constituted, we are 
always also relationally constituted as well as “dispossessed” by our relationships.10  
 
8 Haraway, When Species Meet, 84.  
9 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York, 
Verso, 2004), 20. To feel and extend suffering to others, and to regard suffering as a 
central feature for rethinking the basis of humanity, has been a crucial theme in 
Butler’s work of the last fifteen years. Cf. Judith Butler’s works Antigone's Claim: 
Kinship Between Life & Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), and her 
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence.   
10 Butler, Precarious Life, 24.  
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Haraway offers a way to connect Butler’s ideas on mourning and sharing 
suffering to the issue of sharing suffering with non-human others. In When Species 
Meet, Haraway talks about the important difference between mimetic and 
nonmimetic sharing of pain in the context of lab animals suffering harm. Haraway 
differentiates mimetic sharing of suffering – i.e. “taking the place of the victim,” from 
what she calls true sharing of suffering: “Sometimes, perhaps, ‘taking the place of the 
victim’ is a kind of action ethically required, but I do not think that is sharing.”11 For 
Haraway, to truly share suffering, we must use a non-mimetic approach, which 
implies carefully and ethically paying attention as a witness. Sharing suffering with 
those made unequally vulnerable implies an engagement that “has to be material, 
practical and consequential, the sort of engagement that keeps the inequality from 
becoming commonsensical or taken as obviously okay.”12  
Thus, Haraway’s account of sharing suffering takes note of the need to pay 
attention to suffering and to take our response seriously, so as to invoke “the 
mundane grace to eschew separation, self-certainty, and innocence even in our most 
creditable practices that enforce unequal vulnerability.”13 Accordingly, in her 
thinking about practices with lab animals and their suffering, she asks us to “do the 
work of paying attention and making sure that the suffering is minimal, necessary, 
and consequential.”14  
 Haraway’s discussion of mimetic and non-mimetic sharing reveals the 
importance of reflective affective mediation for making sharing suffering true and 
productive. Over against those thinkers and activists such as Simone Weil who 
argue that the suffering of others needs to be felt (mostly) directly,15 Haraway’s 
account pushes us to recognize that non-mimetic sharing of suffering can serve to 1) 
think through inequalities in suffering,16 2) translate sharing suffering into practical 
and ethical action, ultimately allowing for lessened suffering,17 and 3) provide 
impetus for the education and art of paying attention to suffering.  
 
11 Haraway, When Species Meet, 72. 
12 Haraway, When Species Meet, 77. 
13 Haraway, When Species Meet, 75.  
14 Haraway, When Species Meet, 72.  
15 Weil says “The suffering all over the world obsesses me and overwhelms 
me to the point of annihilating me. The only way I can release myself from this 
obsession, is to take on a large share of danger and hardship myself. That alone can 
save me from being wasted by sterile grief.” (An Encounter with Simone Weil, 
directed and written by Julia Haslett. 2012, USA, 85 min.).  
16 Nussbaum discerns an “obvious propensity for self-serving narrowness” within 
the felt nature of pity, given its tendency to be focused on those close to us, within 
national boundaries (Compassion and Terror, 191). Nussbaum’s argument thereby 
intersects with Butler’s argument in Precarious Life, who similarly pleads for us to 
imagine grief outside of national boundaries, and contemplating why certain lives 
are deemed grievable and others not (Judith Butler, Precarious Life, 32).  
17 Konstan speaks of the issue of “translating compassion into practical and ethical 
action.” Konstan, 187. David Konstan, “Pity, Compassion, and Forgiveness: The 
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 While Haraway, in When Species Meet, clearly delineates how such forms of 
shared suffering should come about in the context of enlightened lab practitioners, 
the task for us, in this paper, is to question what Haraway’s call for sharing suffering 
means for an e-co-affective local-global community to be. In his book Flight Ways, 
Thom van Dooren offers us the technique of telling narratives, creating a space for 
mourning and grief,18 to carve out the possibility of sharing suffering with species 
that are on their way to becoming extinct.19 By telling such stories we may position 
ourselves in a different affective place and reconnect: “to relearn the world and our 
place in it.”20 For Van Dooren, this also means that, individually and collectively, we 
are asked “to face up to the dead and to our role in the coming into being of a world 
of escalating suffering, loss, and extinction.”21  
 Van Dooren’s emphasis on grief and relearning our place in the world 
connects up with Haraway’s account of non-mimetic suffering: in both cases we are 
not simply just involved in someone else’s suffering, but we reach a mediated 
affective space where we reposition ourselves, take responsibility, and become 
changed along the way.  
Still, there are important shortcomings to the above approach of co-suffering, 
even if it allows us to feel our own vulnerability and aligns us with the suffering of 
others through pity or grief. One such shortcoming may be that, as the early Stoics 
and Adam Smith already noted, co-suffering in the form of compassion is too 
narrow-minded and “binds us to our own immediate sphere of life,”22 without 
seeing others in similar need for attention, and without productive consequences. 
Along these lines, Hannah Arendt argued that compassion is, politically speaking, 
irrelevant and problematic, since it forces us into silence and does not invoke 
“persuasion, negotiation and compromise” needed for law and politics.23  
For this project on e-co-affectivity, where I seek to address the need to 
participate in and connect with the ways that other kinds of species and beings are 
 
Moral Terrain.” In The Politics of Compassion, ed. Michael Ure and Mervyn Frost 
(New York: Routledge 2014) 179-188. 
18 Thom Van Dooren, Flight Ways: Life and Loss at the Edge of Extinction (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2014), 126.  
19 Van Dooren, in an email correspondence with Haraway, asks: “how might we 
actually inhabit a shared space of suffering with them [‘critters’], and to what end?” 
As cited in Haraway, When Species Meet, 331, fn 5.  
20 Van Dooren, Flight Ways, 141. 
21 Van Dooren, Flight Ways, 143. 
22 Nussbaum discusses in Upheavals of Thought the various critics of compassion, 
ranging from the early Stoics to Adam Smith. She summarizes their critique, arguing 
compassion “binds us to our own immediate sphere of life, to what has affected us, 
to what we see before us or can easily imagine. This means…that it distorts the 
world: for it effaces the equal value and dignity of all human lives, their equal need 
for resources and for aid in time of suffering.” Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 360.  
23 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1990), 86-87.  
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affected, not just on the local, but on the global level, this objection of 
shortsightedness surely resonates. Thus, the focus so far on the individual, 
psychological, and cognitive aspects of indirect, or non-mimetic suffering, might be 
insufficient to address the broader, global needs of the wider ecological community 
in danger. This especially resonates given the thought that e-co-affectivity ideally 
should speak not only to local, individuated concerns, but to the broader need to be 
affected differently by the totality.  
Another important objection, particularly relevant to this paper, is that the 
accounts of mimetic and non-mimetic sharing of suffering so far formulated are 
geared at contemporaneous human beings, with particular discrete and concrete, 
finite attributes. Is there a way to envision, beyond the anthropos of the present 
moment, and even beyond the anthropocene, a form of e-co-affectivity that speaks 
to a different future, to different possibilities, and possibly to a new ‘us’? And is 
there a way to conceive of this new ‘us’ as emerging both out of a direct, material 
and indirect interaction with the affectivity and suffering of non-human others? 
Especially since the anthropocene as geological and temporal era seems to exceed 
our human place and timescale, such a new ‘us’ might need to be envisioned. If so, 
what might the future geological and temporal era and that new ‘us’ possibly look 
like? And what material interface might grant us such new opportunities? This is 
what the next section of this paper will take on.  
 
2. The New ‘Us’ and the Art of Paying Attention 
 
Amid the ongoing and ever accelerating ecological tragedies of the anthropocene, 
perhaps more accurately called the capitalocene,24 Isabelle Stengers zooms in on the 
human task to shift its affective response. Stengers appeals to us to make us feel and 
think in line with naming25 Gaia’s intrusion. 26 In naming that which has been 
provoked as Gaia (i.e., a “ticklish assemblage of forces”27) and Gaia’s consequent 
reaction as “intrusion,” i.e. as being “blind to the damage she causes, in the manner 
 
24 The term “capitalocene” was first coined by Jason Moore. See “ Anthropocene, 
Capitalocene, and the Myth of Industrialization,” Part I. World-Ecological 
Imaginations, accessed April 8, 2018, 
https://jasonwmoore.wordpress.com/2013/05/13/anthropocene-or-
capitalocene/. Cf. also Donna J. Haraway, “Anthropocene. Capitalocene, 
Plantationocene, Chthulucune: Making Kin,” in Environmental Humanities 6 (2015), 
159-165.  
25 Seth Denizen also emphasizes the importance of the nominative process for 
constructing a new ontology, and he does so in conjunction with the topic of 
bringing about, through rhetoric, the thing “hold in the ozone layer,” and the thing 
“soil” that was previously seen identical to rock. Seth Denizen “Three Holes: In the 
Geological Present.” In Architecture in the Anthropocene: Encounters Among Design, 
Deep Time, Science and Philosophy, ed. Etienne Turpin (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press 2013). http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ohp.12527215.0001.001. 7, 10.  
26 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 43.  
27 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 46.  
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of everything that intrudes,”28 Stengers does not claim that these names are true, 
but at least these names have “the power to make us feel and think in the mode the 
name calls for.”29 Instead of hearing one domineering, human voice that answers the 
question of what is to come,30 she argues we need to take into account “the voices of 
many peoples, knowledges and earthy practices.”31 
Gaia’s intrusion, for Stengers, steers us to learn to respond and to relearn the 
art of paying attention.32 This “[c]reates an obligation to imagine, to check, to 
envisage consequences that bring into play connections between what we are in the 
habit of keeping separate. In short, making ourselves pay attention in the sense that 
attention requires knowing how to resist the temptation to separate what must be 
taken into account and what may be neglected.”33 Paying attention, for Stengers, 
implies going beyond habitual ways of making distinctions, and, instead, making 
room for the interstitial space out of which creativity and new habits (of thinking 
and feeling) might arise. This is not merely a task for the individual: as her focus on 
naming already indicates, Stengers is looking for a collective movement: she calls for 
the “collective reappropriation of the capacity for and art of paying attention.”34 This 
also implies seeking out other narratives that allow for “new modes of resistance,” 
“which refuse the forgetting of the capacity to think and act together that public 
order demands.”35  
The new ‘art’ of paying attention needs to go hand in hand with a new ‘us,’ 
that can “‘face’ Gaia – that is, face the difficult task of participating in an 
entanglement, the ticklish, touchy character which we are just beginning to 
understand.”36 The stories that allow us to imagine this new ‘us’ should decenter 
 
28 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 43. Stengers describes this intrusion as a reaction 
to Gaia being offended: “And the response that Gaia risks giving might well be 
without any measure in relation to what we have done, a bit like a shrugging of the 
shoulder provoked when one is briefly touched by a midge. Gaia is ticklish and that 
is why she must be named as a being. We are no longer dealing (only) with a wild 
and threatening nature, nor with a fragile nature to be protected, nor a nature to be 
mercilessly exploited. The case is new. Gaia, she who intrudes, asks nothing of us, 
not even a response to the question she imposes” (Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 
46).  
29 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 43.  
30 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 50. 
31 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 50. 
32 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 62. 
33 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 62. 
34 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 77. 
35 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 77. Stengers examines one such narrative, that of 
the expropriation of ‘commons.’ 
36 “Stengers, “Matters of Cosmopolitics: On the Provocations of Gaïa: Isabelle 
Stengers in Conversation with Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin,” in Architecture in 
the Anthropocene: ed. Etienne Turpin, 2013. 
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anthropos without seeking substitution:37 instead, such stories, for Stengers, have 
“no entity at the center of the stage. This does not preclude ‘responsibility,’ but 
carries the sense of being able to respond.”38  
For Stengers, one of the topics that can help us ‘face’ Gaia is that of the 
commons, its expropriation,39 and the question of what ‘making common’ means.40 
For this investigation, I suggest that thinking through the material and ontogenetic 
function of soil is crucially important to reimagine ‘us’ participating in a new 
affective entanglement, where entanglement, following Stengers, indicates 
“entangled coexistence,” i.e. the emergence of constellations that are not to be 
grasped as a system of functionality and of parts and whole, but rather as 
assemblages due to “bricolage,” i.e. the construction or creation from a diverse 
range of available things.41  
 
3. Soil and Soil Pores: An Engagement of Soil Science and Plato’s Symposium 
Until the 1870’s, soil was mostly conceptualized as an inert layer, the leftover 
residue of rocks. Only later did soil acquire the status of an active and ontogenetic 
boundary surface, as “a process in itself, in which a system of layers critical to life on 
Earth grows out of fine rock particles.”42 Accordingly, researchers have increasingly 
described soil in terms of both destructive and generative processes, and soil itself 
has been defined as “the interface between lithosphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere, 
and biosphere.”43 Ranging from rocks (the lithosphere) and gas (the atmosphere) to 
liquid (the hydrosphere) and life (the biosphere), soil is an interface on both a 
macro- and micro-level. Considered from a macro-level, soil is a “reaction layer 
between rocks and the chemical, physical and biological environment at the 
atmosphere-lithosphere interface.”44 And from a micro-level, we can argue that soil, 
qua soil, includes all these spheres as components of itself (i.e. rocks, air, water, and 
 
37 Stengers’ proposition is in that regard different than what Puig de la Bellacasa 
suggests, namely, following Boum and Hartemink, to put “the living earth” in a 
central position, “from which are derived the limits within which human societies 
can develop. María Puig de la Bellacasa, “Encountering Bioinfrastructure: Ecological 
Struggles and the Sciences of Soil,” Social Epistemology 28, no. 1 (2014): 31.  
38 Stengers, “Matters of Cosmopolitics.” 
39 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 79-89.  
40 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 89.  
41 Cf. Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2010), 34. For instance, in her account of ecology, Stengers argues that ecology is 
“not a science of functions,” but that populations and their formation and functions 
need to be seen as products of bricolage: “all we can say of which is that it “works 
more or less,” and not of a calculation whose economy and logic would have to be 
disclosed.” 
42 Denizen, “Three Holes: In the Geological Present,” 12.  
43 Nyle C. Brady & Ray R. Weil, Elements of the Nature and Properties of Soils, Third 
Edition, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2010), 9 
44 Robert Minard Garrels, A Textbook of Geology (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1951) 24.  
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living organisms); individual soils mix those worlds – of rock, air, water and living 
beings45 – in different proportions.46 The complexity and productivity47 of such 
interactions cannot be understated, and in this regard soil is similar to other 
intricate environments such as estuaries.48  
 Perhaps surprisingly, the functioning of soil depends for approximately fifty 
percent on soil pores49: the mostly invisible interstitial places that form its 
connective tissue.  
  
[S]paces in soil that are not occupied by soils are called pores. Actually, they 
are not void; they are filled with either air or water, or both, depending on 
the soil moisture content and condition of rainfall and irrigation. Roots and 
soil organisms, both macro- and microflora and fauna, occupy these pores.50  
 
This textbook definition establishes the contradictory nature of pores by first 
defining pores as void of soil, only to subsequently define them in terms of their 
many functions – absorbing and percolating water and air, providing space to roots 
and soil organisms – that make soil such a dynamic interface. There is a conceptual 
hesitancy to make that which is non-solid (and thus that which is not firm, unstable 
in shape and with gaps) part of the definition of soil. Still, as Brady and Weil confirm, 
“the spaces between the particles of solid material are just as important to the 
nature of a soil as are the solids themselves. It is in these pore spaces that air and 
water circulate, roots grow, and microscopic creatures live.”51 
 The conceptual hesitancy to rethink the nature of soil in terms of its 
interstitial pores parallels the need to provide an ontology of substances and to 
neglect the material, ontological in-between that makes distinctions between solid 
versus dynamic (and being vs. non-being) fluid and problematic, for instance by 
 
45 Brady and Weil, Elements of Nature and Properties of Soils, 11.  
46 The relative proportions of these four components greatly influence the behavior 
and productivity of soils. In a soil, the four components are mixed in complex 
patterns. Cf. Brady and Weil, Elements of Nature and Properties of Soils, 15.  
47 Shiva cites a Danish study, which found in a cubic meter of soil the following: 
“50,000 small earth worms, 50,000 insects and mites, and 12 million roundworms. 
A gram of the soil contained 30,000 protozoa, 50,0000 algae, 400,000 fungi, and 
billions of individual bacteria.” Vandana Shiva, Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in 
a Time of Climate Crisis (London: Zed Books, 2008), 97. 
48 Brady and Weil, Elements of Nature and Properties of Soils, 9.  
49 Brady and Weil describe this well: “although a handful of soil may at first seem to 
be a solid thing, it should be noted that only about half the soil volume consists of 
solid material (mineral and organic); the other half consists of pore spaces filled 
with air or water” (Elements of Nature and Properties of Soils 15).  
50 Khan Towhid Osman, Soils: Principles, Properties and Management (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2013) 56-57.  
51 Brady and Weil, Elements of Nature and Properties of Soils, 15. 
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linking them through porous boundaries.52 Along these lines, Merleau-Ponty 
encourages us to “see as things the intervals between things themselves,” allowing 
us to perceive “another world.”53 And Derrida, in his writings on the conceptual 
boundaries between animal and human, pleads for “limitrophy”: thinking about 
“what feeds the limit, generates it, raises it, and complicates it.”54  
What would happen if we come to see soil’s pores differently, perhaps by 
following a speculative path rooted in Greek etymology55 of the term poros?56 And 
specifically, what results if we trace pores back to Plato’s definition of the Greek God 
Poros in the Symposium? In Plato’s Symposium, Diotima recounts to Socrates the 
origin of love (Eros), the divine spirit who is born of the male God Poros, and the 
female spirit Penia. Poros is the god of intense pursuit and resourcefulness, and 
Penia is the embodiment of need and poverty. 57 Resembling his father Poros, Eros 
 
[i]s a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous and 
intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful in his 
pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life; a genius with 
enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings.58  
 
 
52 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), 29.  
53 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge 
Classics, 2002), 18.  
54 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 29.  
55 The standard definition of pore, as the OED defines it, is “a minute interstice 
between particles of matter esp. in soil or rock.” The OED Online, Version 2016, 
accessed February 9, 2017. As for its Greek etymology, OED writes: “ancient Greek 
πόρος passage, channel in the human body.” The full etymology as given by OED is 
the following: Etymology: < Middle French pore opening in the skin (end of 13th 
cent. in Old French), interstice in porous matter (c1400 or earlier), duct (1478 or 
earlier as porre ), stoma (1765) and its etymon post-classical Latin porus passage, 
channel in the human body (4th cent.) < ancient Greek πόρος passage, channel in 
the human body, pore < the same Indo-European base as fare v.1 Compare Old 
Occitan por (c1350; Occitan pòre), Catalan porus, (now nonstandard) poro, †por 
(13th cent.), Spanish poro (c1250), Portuguese poro (14th cent.), Italian poro 
(a1311).”  
56 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press,1996), 1450-1451. Liddell and Scott articulate 4 main meanings in 
the ancient Greek: 1) pathway or passage (through the sea, body, etc.); 2) with the 
genitive: way or means of achieving, accomplishing or discovering, 3) journey, 
voyage, 4) personified as father of Eros, Poros.  
57 Plato, Symposium, in Plato on Love, ed. C.D.C. Reeve., trans. Alexander Nehamas 
and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 203d. 
58 Plato, Symposium 203d. 
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If we follow this line of thought, pores are not to be thought of as unsteady, empty 
and discontinuous spaces, but instead as places of pursuit and resourcefulness. And 
certainly when we grasp that pores are embedded within a whole network of pores, 
they emerge as channels and places for connectivity – “weaving snares,” as Plato 
would call it. Moreover, pores – as reflective of Poros’ status as parent of love (Eros) 
– point at a channeling of energy to a new generation, to a new demonic existence 
that is always in movement.59 This demonic existence of the in-between (metaxu) 
lets Eros and other daemons serve as messengers and hermeneutic mediators 
between finitude and transcendence. As mediators, they do not just shuttle back and 
forth, but actually constitute and connect, i.e. hold together, that which is finite and 
that which transcends it: “Being in the middle of the two, they [spirits, daemons] 
round out the whole and bind fast the all to all.”60  
By birthing Eros, Poros’ resourcefulness becomes productive in the lives of 
finite, material beings through their constant erotic quests: 
 
He [Eros] is by nature neither immortal nor mortal. But now he springs to life 
when he gets his way; now he dies – all in the very same day. Because he is 
his father’s son, however, he keeps coming back to life, but then the 
resources he acquires always slip away, and for this reason Love is never 
completely without resources, nor is he ever rich.61  
 
If Poros’ nature is to give birth to a fertile, demonic existence that is immersed in 
finitude and yet breaks through it, then the soil’s pores and what they enable 
gesture toward a complex combination of finitude, fertility, and generational 
transcendence. This complex form entails both the limitations of those finite beings 
involved in it, as well the creative cultivation of nearly unlimited, yet unthought and 
unfelt, possibilities enabled through the rupture of finite time.  
 In sum, focusing on soil as mediating interface for a new ‘us’ is effective in 
that it offers us a way to imagine a joint, participatory material body that connects – 
weaves snares – between all of us, yet does so in a way that does not homogenize 
and overpower. Rather, it empowers invention, resourcefulness and creativity 
through that which moves, while being itself non-firm, unstable and liminal. It may 
thus allow for the formation of a non-anthropocentric ‘us,’ whose name and being is 
yet-to-be determined. This would be a Latourian ‘us’ where human agency is not 
only part of a larger constellation, but mediated and transformed in such a way that 
we may no longer call such agency by the current name of “human.”62 
 
59 Plato, Symposium, 203e.  
60 Plato, Symposium, 202e.  
61 Plato, Symposium, 203e.  
62 Stengers argues: “I make a strong distinction between a ‘Latourian us’ to be 
composed, who might possibly become able to ‘face’ Gaïa—that is, face the difficult 
task of participating in an entanglement, the ticklish, touchy character which we are 
just beginning to understand—and the ‘us (moderns, Euro-Americans, Western, 
whatever) for whom the very idea of this task distastefully intrudes, for those whose 
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Secondly, soil presents us with an embodiment of an archetypal reaction 
surface, constantly transforming and reconfiguring itself with incredible 
resourcefulness. It allows us to see time and place as in-motion, constantly shifting, 
entailing different temporal and spatial directions. Finally, as an emergent porous 
body full of opportunities, soil seems to create and nurture place and time, rather 
than the opposite: being the “space” or “place” or “time” in which things are placed. 
The next section will elaborate on these remarkable dimensions of time and space 
as they pertain to soil.  
  
 
4. Soil, Place and Temporality, and Re-Intervening with Soil 
Thinking of soil, and soil pores, on a temporal level holds potential benefit as a 
prism for shaping a new us. By grasping both the synchronic and diachronic time of 
soil, soil’s temporality lends perspective to our finite human phenomenologies. It 
has been estimated that “it takes 700 to 1,500 years to generate an inch of soil, or 
300 to 600 years for a centimeter of soil.”63 If this is true, then the temporality of soil 
provides an important contrast to human temporalities, and provides an alternative 
imagining beyond the minuscule timescale of human, finite time. Moreover, the 
temporality afforded by soil not only confronts us with its profound and complex 
past, but also with rich, emergent possibilities yet to come. Rebecca Hill, reading 
Irigaray’s work on the interval, adds important insights here, relevant to 
understanding the temporal complexity of soil and, specifically, soil pores:  
 
[T]he interval is a threshold that gestures towards the impossibility of 
mastering place and time. Why? The past inscribed through and as place 
remains beyond recuperation in the present, and the futures inscribed as 
place cannot be anticipated by definition.64 
 
Soil pores certainly serve as synchronous limits, holding and limiting content 
thereby constituting place and time in the present; pending size and depth of 
placement, each percolates in its own time. For example, large pores allow for “fast 
infiltration and percolation of water” and small ones have “strong attractive forces 
to hold water in the pore.”65 In terms of place, pores are the discrete transit points 
between the various material ‘spheres’ of soil, thereby suturing the (seemingly) 
uniform space of soil.  
Pores represent and enable diachronic time, a time of slow yet continuous 
change that we cannot usually readily perceive. For that reason, much like Irigaray’s 
 
hairs stick up when they hear the word Gaïa.” Stengers, “Matters of Cosmopolitics,” 
2013.  
63 Daniel C. Fouke, “Humans and the Soil,” in Environmental Ethics 33 (Summer 
2011): 150. 
64 Rebecca Hill, The Interval: Relation and Becoming in Irigaray, Aristotle, and 
Bergson (New York: Fordham University Press 2012) 66. 
65 Khan Towhid Osman, Soils: Principles, Properties and Management (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2013), 57 
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conception of the interval, each pore “is a sensible, porous, and mobile threshold to 
pasts and to futures that cannot be recuperated or anticipated or said to have being. 
The interval remains in radical excess of calculation and definition in the inflexible 
form of a traditional concept.”66 Such radical excess, beyond the concrete now, is 
also applicable to the place of pores: pores, while constituting definite, concrete 
spatial limits, also have constant movement and interchange between them, thus 
influencing beyond their own limits that which passes through them.  
That pores hold such a mobile threshold to the past becomes particularly 
apparent with the development of biopores, which are “macropores created by 
roots, earthworms, and other organisms.”67 Due to the passing of worms, or the 
death and decay of plant roots, biopores could be said to contain carved-out traces 
of the past, constituting the limitations of the present while enabling soil’s future; 
these pores enable the fruition of new life by channeling nutrients and providing a 
vibrant, dynamic place for plant roots and microorganisms to grow, die, and recycle.  
Similar to this conception of the interval, soil pores transcend typically 
human, short-term reckoning with time. Is there a way to transform our current 
sense of human temporality to be more responsive to the temporality of the soil? 
What would such responsiveness look like?  
If we take into account the slow, emerging time of soil’s origin in combination 
with its porous, percolating nature, then human practices that engage with such 
enduring soil temporality and porosity include current popular initiatives such as 
the shift to “slow food”68 or even, more generally, “slow living” and “slow 
movement.”69 Other, similar practices include increased composting of household 
green waste (another way of using our own waste to “re-invent” soil), the use of 
green manure, and, in the context of urban construction, keeping current vegetation 
as “undisturbed” as possible, preserving topsoil for “reapplication,” and re-
engineering soil after construction, aiming to ensure its quality.70 Additionally, 
 
66 Hill, The Interval 72.  
67 Brady and Weil, Elements of Nature and Properties of Soils, 122.  
68 Carlo Petrini, Slow Food Nation: Why Our Food Should Be Good, Clean, and Fair 
(New York, NY : Rizzoli Ex Libris, 2013), 11. Petrini describes his visit to one of the 
faming families involved in the “Quali Project,” a project which reintroduces 
amaranth in a poor, increasingly desert-like area in Mexico. Petrini seeks to 
illustrate how emphasis on locally grown, sustainable crops may provide farmers 
stability based on a local economy while also recuperating their own traditional 
indigenous cuisine.  
69 The Slow Movement website addresses both the cultural need for increased 
connectivity and the need for slowing down. This is discussed in greater detail at 
http://www.slowmovement.com/ 
70 Cf.  http://www.sustainabletechnologies.ca/wp/home/healthy-soils/ 
15 
 
farming practices71 that rely on long-term tilling72 would need to be minimized. 
Thus, pleas have been made on behalf of “conservation tillage” which decreases soil 
tillage and keeps the organic residue intact. Many of these suggested changes in 
farming – less tilling and green manure, for instance – are slowly but surely making 
their way into mainstream farming, thus indicating that even within the over-
arching capitalist framework of modern agriculture,73 such changes can be 
incorporated, especially when farmers see the immediate financial benefits of these 
changes, such as through increased monetary yield connected with improved soil 
fertility and decreased soil erosion.74  
Still, while the above strategies are promising as we seek to be more 
responsive to the temporal structures of the soil, they seem to uncritically assume 
that we need to forsake technology and return to pre-industrial techniques such as 
no tilling. However, do not some current technology-infused strategies, even if 
limited in their scope and technological imagination, show us that we can engage 
geological temporality more responsibly without turning back the clock on modern 
forms of life? These strategies include the use of GPS, Web based Apps, and 
everyday robotics.75 For instance, the implementation of satellite navigation may 
“boost efficiency and cut soil loss by dispersing seed for a cover crop between rows 
 
71 Osman articulates the advantages and disadvantages of farming practices rather 
conservatively: “Soil management practices such as tillage, irrigation, fertilizer and 
manure application, liming, and cropping patterns all have positive and negative 
impacts on soil structure. Over-tilling, over-irrigation, and mono-cropping damage 
soil structure” (Soils: Principles, Properties and Management , 55). 
72 Brady and Weil stipulate how short-term tilling has radically different effects, also 
with regard to porosity, than long-term tilling. “In the short term, stirring the soil 
often allows it to dry out faster and also mixes in large quantities of air.” […]. “In the 
long term, however, tillage may reduce macroporosity” (Brady and Weil, Elements of 
Nature and Properties of Soils, 207.  
73 Vandana Shiva casts the current ecological and food crisis in terms of oil vs. soil: 
“the industrialized, globalized food system is based on oil; biodiverse, organic, and 
local food systems are based on living soil. The industrialized system is based on 
creating waste and pollution; a living agriculture is based on no waste. The 
industrialized system is based on monocultures; sustainable systems are based on 
diversity.” Vandana Shiva, Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in a Time of Climate 
Crisis (London: Zed Books, 2008), 104.  
74 More farmers are abandoning plowing, allowing for more productive soil. Cf. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/science/farmers-put-down-the-plow-for-
more-productive-soil.html 
75 Sites such as FarmHack cater to sharing such inventions to small-scale farmers. 
Andrew Revkin provides a good overview of such technologies in this December 4, 
2014 article in the NY Times: Dot Earth (blog); “On Smaller Farms, Including 





of corn plants well before the corn is harvested.”76 Solar-powered tractors have 
been developed in conjunction with modern apps that help farmers “keep track of 
plantings, harvests, and yields.”77 And, if we think along the lines of recent bio-
engineering technologies that make use of natural microbial consortia to improve 
soil fertility, or technologies that wean plants off their dependence upon fertilizers, 
we can push this line of argumentation even further: is there precisely not a distinct 
need for a form of technics, for a form of prosthesis, that mediates and re-engineers 
our access to geological temporality and changes the agricultural system 
accordingly?  
The progressive development and imagination necessary to push such 
technologies to an innovative level admittedly takes time, as generations of farmers 
need to shake up their old habits, usually acquired over decades from the previous 
generations. Often, older generations must die before new habits can truly take hold. 
As one farmer says: “One of the toughest things about learning to do no-till is having 
to unlearn all the things that you thought were true.”78 Still, human dependence on 
soil stands at a critical threshold, with a future looming over us precariously as 
much as it holds promise. How might we, using the trope of soil, envision a less 
precarious, more hopeful, future?  
 
5. Moving Beyond the Anthropocene: Soil and the New ‘Us’  
 
What belongs properly to human societies is the question raised by 
its interstices, at the risk that some social answers to this question 
may turn against their culture… (Isabelle Stengers, Thinking with 
Whitehead).79 
 
In search for the new ‘us’ that, following Stengers, can “face the difficult task of 
participating in an entanglement,”80 the material and ontogenetic functions of soil 
and its pores may offer us ways to imagine ourselves beyond the anthropocene,81 
 
76 Revkin, “On Smaller Farms, Including Organic Farms, Technology and Tradition 
Meet.”  
77 Revkin, “On Smaller Farms, Including Organic Farms, Technology and Tradition 
Meet. 
78 Erica Goode, citing McAlister, in “Farmers Put Down the Plow for More Productive 
Soil,” NY Times, March 9, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/science/farmers-put-down-the-plow-for-
more-productive-soil.html. 
79 Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts, 328.  
80 “Matters of Cosmopolitics: On the Provocations of Gaïa: Isabelle Stengers in 
Conversation with Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin,” in Architecture in the 
Anthropocene: Encounters Among Design, Deep Time, Science and Philosophy, ed. 
Etienne Turpin, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ohp.12527215.0001.001.  
81 As Haraway writes in “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, 
Chthulucune,” we should seek to keep the anthropocene as a geological time as 
short as possible: “I think our job is to make the Anthropocene as short/thin as 
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inspiring hopes for a new future and new indexical ‘we.’ Haraway calls for a new 
epoch, that of the chthulucene, to imagine such a different future. She bases her 
chosen term for the new epoch, the chthulucene, upon the Greek roots chthōn and 
kainos; with chthōn referring to the Greek term for earth, land, and country.82 With 
chthōn Haraway specifically means “beings of the earth, both ancient and up-to-the-
minute […] replete with tentacles, feelers, digits, cords, whiptails, spider legs, and 
very unruly hair.”83 Kainos refers to time, particularly the sense of what Haraway 
calls “a thick, ongoing presence.”84  
While there is a close intimacy between my approach and Haraway’s, 
especially given her focus on chthōn as related the earth,85 I suggest, if only playfully, 
that my argument instead calls for the soilocene, to index that I seek an alternative 
way of being temporalized by the interface of the soil rather than through the figure 
of individuated animal beings living in the earth or beneath its surface as indicated 
by chthōn.86  
By suggesting the soilocene rather than the chtulucene, I share Haraway’s 
aim for a future beyond the anthropocene, yet seek to shift her focus on a particular 
(tentacular) form of life after which we might model ourselves and our future to that 
of the material and ontogenetic interface of soil. This gestures a shift from figure to 
interface: rather than thinking from the perspective of individuated critters living in 
the earth, my focus on soil offers an example of a participatory material body that 
 
possible and to cultivate with each other in every way imaginable epochs to come 
that can replenish refuge” (160). 
82 Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 1991. 
83 Haraway continues: “Chthonic ones romp in multicritter humus but have no truck 
with sky-gazing Homo. Chthonic ones are monsters in the best sense; they 
demonstrate and perform the material meaningfulness of earth processes and 
critters.” Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 2.  
84 Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 2. 
85 Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 57. Another example of affinity between my 
approach and Haraway’s can be found in Haraway’s allusions to compost. As 
Haraway’s focus on compost shows, she is very much in line with a co-emergence 
and a sense of re-generative “composting” that allows us to move forward: “The 
unfinished Chthulucene must collect up the trash of the Anthropocene, the 
exterminism of the Capitalocene, and chipping and shredding and layering like a 
mad gardener, make a much hotter compost pile for still possible pasts, presents, 
and futures.”  
86 If I were to develop this further, beyond the confines of the current argument, I 
might suggest the term “soliocene,” using the Latin root for soil and ground, solium. 
The use of this Latin variation of soil is intended to direct us away from its current 
instantiation and alert us to soil’s unexplored past, as well as its possibilities yet to 
come. The OED provides as etymology for soil: “< Anglo-Norman soil, soyl in sense 
2b (1292–1305), apparently representing Latin solium (whence also Old French soil 
, suel : see soil n.2), taken in the sense of Latin solum (French sol ) ground. For Scots 
forms see also sulye n.” The OED Online 2016, accessed February 26, 2017.  
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itself is not one but many in unity, while still bridging divisions between non-living 
and living matter: an affective interface that as much as it houses life simultaneously 
invents it. Due to this, the soilocene can effectively express the need to be affected by 
a totality, rather than extending compassion from one being to another – one 
tentacle at a time. Because of this, it equally satisfies what Haraway seeks, namely 
the project of “making kin,”87 albeit in an even more co-affective, communal, 
material sense.  
The soilocene has the additional benefit of emphasizing the importance of 
sym-pathesis and its ensuing middle voice. While Haraway draws our focus on how 
the chthulucene will enable sym-poiesis, which, in her words, “enfolds autopoiesis 
and generatively unfurls and extends it,”88 my project, while closely connected in 
affinity to Haraway’s, shifts the focus from the subjective act of doing things in 
community (sym-poiesis) to being communally and locally affected (sym-pathesis) 
and co-emerging together. Sympathesis, in being rooted in paschein and thus the 
root verb for affectivity, has the advantage of emphasizing that any process of 
emergent generation is not simply dependent upon individual actors that are 
already established and act-in-collaboration, but is rather dependent upon a co-
affective process out of which emergent beings unfold and become.  
Finally, as a temporal and spatial reaction surface that constantly transforms 
and reconfigures itself, soil allows us to see time and place in motion, perpetually 
changing. More particularly, in having multiple layers and thus different senses of 
place and time (duration), soil yields different temporal and spatial directions and 
thus different places, pasts and futures.  
In short, soil’s meaning as interface (and its figurative capacity to link 
together many entities as well as various temporalities and localities into a new 
community to be) is promising. Still, the following questions remain: how can we 
shake up our habits,89 break through regimes of feeling, and allow ourselves to be 
co-constructed differently?90 How can affective and aesthetic cuts, these 
 
87 This requires, according to Haraway, making “oddkin,” if we want to stay with the 
trouble. For, “we require each other in unexpected collaborations and combinations, 
in hot compost piles. We become-with each other or not at all.” Haraway, Staying 
with the Trouble, 2. Sahlins writes the following about kinship: “This, then, is what I 
take a ‘kinship system’ to be: a manifold of intersubjective participations, which is 
also to say, a network of mutualities of being.” Marshall Sahlins, What Kinship Is – 
And Is Not (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 20. Deborah 
Bird Rose, in Reports from a Wild Country, speaks of how, for the aboriginal 
worldview, “kinship includes the natural world” and extends into land. Deborah 
Bird Rose, Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics for Decolonisation (Sydney, NSW: 
UNSW Press), 2004, 187. 
88 Haraway focuses on sympoiesis, “making with,” to indicate “worlding with,” and 
being in company: “Sympoiesis enfolds autopoiesis and generatively unfurls and 
extends it” Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 58.  
89 Stengers, In Catastrophic Times, 24.  
90 In “The Body We Care For,” Vinciane Despret discusses how in certain animal-
human interactions we do not just collaborate, but come to co-constitute each other. 
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“revolutions of our senses” as Rancière calls them, happen? And how can we be 
more aware of this in-between, multilayered, spatio-temporal connective interface? 
How can we allow for the development of trust,91 specifically one that indicates 
one’s affirmative engagement in a community that transcends that of humans? On 
what soil are we standing or should we be standing? How can we preserve the 
emphatic middle voice of soil, with its implied destituent power, without losing 
traction on the meaning and function of human intervention? What emergent 
possibilities may be created for us once we imagine ourselves created and produced 
by the material interface of soil, with its mutually implicating spaces?  
 Stengers’ reading of Whitehead, and specifically her analysis of Whitehead’s 
concept of the interstice, offers an important suggestion for how we may allow this 
new ‘us’ to emerge. For Whitehead, “life lurks in the interstices of each living cell.”92 
And since life, for Whitehead, implies originality and creativity, Stengers 
analogously argues that only societies that are perceptive to the interstices that 
bound and ground them can tolerate originality and creativity: 
 
[W]hen a society mobilizes for war, the interstices become imperceptible, 
and all originality is suspected of treason. Only a society that does not define 
the environment on which it depends as a threat can tolerate originals.93  
 
A culture that embraces its interstices and the imaginations and questions of doubt 
it holds, would “open a human collectivity to an outside whose intrusion suspends 
habitual social functioning, ”94 and allow such interstices “to propagate themselves,” 
fruitfully leading to “disobedience and desertion.”95  
 
Both human and animal become “available to the transformation of their identities” 
(122). Similarly, I want to argue, we should seek to become available to be 
transformed by the figure of soil. Cf. Vinciane Despret, “The Body We Care For: 
Figures of Anthropo-Zoo-Genesis,” in Body and Society 10, nos. 2-3 (June 2004): 111-
34.  
91 While Adriaan Peperzak words this mostly in an intersubjective, human context, 
much can be learned from his emphasis on participation as crucial to the 
phenomenon of trust: “[t]rust creates a kind of participation between you and me, 
and this changes my life, including my feeling, working, and thinking, at least in 
some aspect and to a certain extent” (10). The generation of trust takes time, based 
as it is on past experiences and with an orientation towards the future: “Trust 
testifies to our dependence; it implies gratitude for the present result of a 
cooperative past and hope that things will continue to function well.” Adriaan T. 
Peperzak, Trust: Who or What Might Support Us? (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013) 80.  
92 Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected edition 
by D.R. Griffin and D.W. Sherburn (New York: Free Press, 1979), 105-106.  
93 Isabelle Stengers, Thinking With Whitehead, trans. Michael Chase, (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011) 327. 
94 Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead, 328. 
95 Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead, 332. 
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 Following Stengers’ ideas, and tracing the import of soil’s successful 
dependence on its vibrant pores, a new ‘us’ may thus appear by allowing interstices 
to “make themselves felt,”96 as these are the places where “new possibilities of 
relevance lurk.”97 Here lies the opportunity to reconstitute ourselves and our 
perceptions, to bring about new alliances, to break down barriers while constituting 
a new ‘us’; all while simultaneously keeping in mind questions of race, class, gender, 
and species, as much as bios writ large. It is also here where the interstitial cracks 
may be widened and conceptually intersect with the ambitious vision of Plato’s eros. 
Plato’s eros shows us how the realm of the in-between is immersed in finitude and 
yet breaks through it: Plato’s eros shows us that the in-between is fertile with new 
opportunities that ever emerge as well as disappear. If trust, as Stengers argues, “is 
one of the many names for love,” and that one can “never be indifferent to the trust 
you inspire,98” then Plato’s focus on the role of love as dynamically emerging in the 
in-between may inspire us to put trust in the dynamic, porous interface of soil and 
to trust the possibilities and new modes of existence arising out of the soil, rather 
than imposing on them all too familiar categories of human sapient meaning that 
stifle its fertility and block its ever becoming anew.  
Along with an aesthetic and epistemic sensitivity to the interstitial 
boundaries of our culture and nature, our society is in need of aesthetic and 
epistemic deceleration and percolation. A culture can only become perceptive to its 
interstices once it slows down, relearns patience and develops endurance. This 
cannot be a culture that only privileges and lives by chronological standardized 
time, with its “imperialist regime”99 that dominates and homogenizes all other forms 
of time and life. As Jonathan Crary persuasively shows in his book 24/7, the kind of 
time we currently encounter is this: 24/7 is “a time without time, a time extracted 
from any material of identifiable demarcations, a time without sequence or 
recurrence.”100 This is a homogenized kind of time, dictated by capitalism and its 
injunctions to constantly perform and to be “on” non-stop: it inscribes into human 
life “a duration without breaks, defined by a principle of continuous functioning. It is 
a time that no longer passes.”101 In this world of 24/7, there is no longer any place 
for deceleration, unplugging, and sleep. The consequence of 24/7, is, according to 
Crary, “the sweeping abandonment of the pretense that time is coupled to any long-
term undertakings, even to fantasies of “progress” or development. An illuminated 
 
96 Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead, 437. 
97 Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead, 484. 
98 Isabelle Stengers, “God’s Heart and the Stuff of Life” Conference, 1996. As cited in: 
Vinciane Despret, “The Body we Care For,” 122.. 
99 Frieling speaks of the “imperialist regime of standardized time.” Rudolf Frieling, 
Curator, Text Accompanying Artwork The Refusal of Time, by William Kentbridge. 
SFMOMA ,Exhibited February 2017. 
100 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (New York: Verso, 
2014), 29.  
101 Crary, 24/7, 8.  
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24/7 world without shadows is the final capitalist mirage of post-history, of an 
exorcism of the otherness that is the motor of historical change.”102 
Thus, Crary diagnoses that the post-industrial capitalist underpinnings of 
24/7 deprive us of the opportunity for long-term undertakings, since it offers a 
world merely identical to itself without offering room for alternate temporalities 
and discernment of social and ethical valuations.103 We can only change our form of 
experiencing time, if we rethink our economic and political regimes. Along these 
same lines, Stiegler argues that we can only resist such a homogenized, and 
constantly accelerating, form of temporality, and “save time,” if there is a 
“transvaluation of the industrial economy.” Only then may we be propelled into a 
new epoch, provocatively and dialectically called the Neganthropocene:  
 
The Anthropocene is unsustainable: it is a massive and high-speed process 
of destruction operating on a planetary scale, and its current direction must 
be reversed. The question and the challenge of the Anthropocene is 
therefore the ‘Neganthropocene.’104 
 
For Stiegler, the Neganthropocene can only be brought about once we employ 
negentropic forces that, precisely by using alternative forms of technology, 
transform the speed of current “technological vectors” (merely aimed at increasing 
entropy) and, literally, allow us “to save time.”105  
Should we pay closer attention to the meaning of the term ‘percolation,’ it 
becomes clearer what cultivating such a new form of receptivity entails. Percolation 
is the process of “causing a liquid to permeate through a porous body or 
medium.”106 The force behind the action, the quality of the medium, the size of its 
pores, and the contact time all matter. Given this, cultivating an epistemic and 
aesthetic sensitivity toward percolation implies sensitivity to the organization of our 
affective experience: for instance, awareness of the kind and the size of the forces 
that drive it toward or away from percolation, its filtering capacity (what it 
 
102 Crary, 24/7, 9. 
103 Crary, 24/7, 19, 33.  
104 Bernard Stiegler, “Escaping the Anthropocene,” Lecture at Durham University, 
January 2015, 3. 
https://www.academia.edu/12692287/Bernard_Stiegler_Escaping_the_Anthropoce
ne_2015_ 
105 Bernard Stiegler, “Escaping the Anthropocene,” 11. By emphasizing negentropic 
forces, he criticizes the notion of entropic, i.e. static and closed, systems and favors 
instead dynamic systems aimed at diversification.  
106 Cf. OED entry percolation: “the action of causing a liquid to percolate through a 
porous body or medium; (Pharmacol. and Biochem.) the process of obtaining an 
extract by passing successive quantities of a solvent through pulverized plant 
material until all the soluble material has been extracted; an instance of this.” 
The OED Online, Version 2016, accessed March 2017.  
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eliminates and keeps and on what basis), and the contact time (speed) it provides to 
process experiences.  
If we link this thought to soil and its temporality, while following soil’s 
enduring diachronic trail, a new ‘us’ would be inclined to create space for a more 
reflective, percolative, and patient temporal existence, one where possibilities 
slowly yet steadily emerge out of coincidental assemblages,107 and where multiple 
directions and opportunities unfold simply through the gradual passing of time. 
Making space for this alternative, decelerated, more percolative form of temporality 
does not preclude urgent action or intervention on the part of current humans: on 
the contrary, unlearning our own habits, and shaping new ones,108 requires the 
pressing, active work of adapting to a new form of receptivity.  
It is here where the various theorists addressing the importance of “paying 
attention” to suffering come together. Haraway’s account of sharing suffering and 
paying attention in When Species Meet alerts us to the inescapable fact of our 
participatory existence, and levels ethical injunctions at us to care for the non-
human other and to alleviate and minimize the suffering of others we may have 
caused. Stengers and Stiegler articulate another way in which paying attention to 
the suffering of others is important, and do so at the macrolevel. For Stengers, 
paying attention to ecological devastation can be mobilized through different 
epistemologies and languages, and by carefully choosing names and concepts we 
may gain traction – and alter – our feelings and habitus in light of the catastrophe 
we face. Stiegler, for his part, also focuses on this macrolevel, but addresses the need 
for change to our political-economic systems, which have transformed our affective 
register and have suspended our creativity and abilities to pay attention to what 
really matters. According to Stiegler, only through this transformation to our 
affective regime can we install the Neganthropocene.  
The proposed vision for a new ‘us’ seems improbable, if it were not that our 
predicament calls for this possibility to be realized immediately, especially now, 
especially here, at the edge of the anthropocene. Similar to recent artistic renditions, 
including those of Indian artist Tejal Shah that show the possibility to find beauty by 
embracing the post-apocalypse and dancing on heaps of filthy garbage,109 the 
possibility of creating a new ‘us’ will be difficult, but, perhaps, not impossible. Soil 
and its pores point the way and provide a living, connective tissue: beyond the 
concrete and discrete individual, here and now, refusing homogeneous space and 
standardized chronological time, they direct us toward other places, toward other 
 
107 For Stengers, slowing down, “is multi-critter thinking, caring for entanglement, 
learning the art of paying attention.” Stengers, Matters of Cosmopolitics.”  
108 Smudgestudio is one of the artist collectives that seeks to connect us to such a 
deeper notion of time. See the curatorial statement: “We believe that as works made 
in response to geologic time become more common, human capacities to design, 
imagine, and live in relation to deep time will expand.” Smudge Studio, accessed 
April 4, 2017, http://smudgestudio.org/. 
109 I owe this reference to the insightful presentation by Amanda Boetzkes at the 
Annual Meeting of IAEP at SPEP, Salt Lake City, October 2016. This video is part of 
the Between the Waves cycle by Tejal Shah, shown at dOCUMENTA 13.  
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times, toward solidarity with other beings, toward unexpected assemblages and 
gatherings,110 aiming at a future yet unimaginable, but hopefully full of liquidity, 






For Gaston Bachelard, “[a]material image dynamically experienced, passionately 
adopted, patiently explored, is an opening in every sense of the word, in its real 
sense and its figurative sense.”111 This is exactly what I think the focus on soil 
accomplishes: soil is inescapably tangible and material in its reality, yet enigmatic 
and porous as well. For that reason, it serves not only as an example of a material 
interface we always already engage with, but also as a powerful metaphor, not only 
to re-imagine but to change our affects and discourses. Comparable to how certain 
terms and metaphors such as ‘immunity’ suddenly keep hold of discourses and 
change our practices, similarly, so is my hope, can the metaphor of soil, following 
Blumenberg’s idea of metaphors, reach down into the substructure of thought and 
existence, 112 and thus initiate a new way of living, feeling, acting, and thinking.  
However, in my view, the levels of direct and indirect interaction with the 
affectivity of the soil may converge if we look at soil from the broader lens of our 
political and economic context. If it is the case that, following the ideas of Stiegler, 
the industrial capture of attention systematically “deforms our attention,”113 then 
there is reason to think that we can, once again, foster and reform attention,114 and 
rescue and remake “savoir faire,” i.e. “knowledge of how to make and do,”115 if there 
is a change to current political and economic regimes so as to allow for different 
ways of (psychic and collective) individuation.  
What we need, I argue with Stiegler, is thus a new “politics of 
individuation,116” one which refers to the materiality and community of the soil and 
intervenes with it creatively and responsibly, fostering attention for long-term goals 
and dreams that have currently been blocked by the short-term vision and 
 
110 Thus, whereas Puig de la Bellacasa pleads for “new affective entanglements with 
invisible workers of the soil,” my argument is broader and more future-oriented in 
that it aims to use the trope of the soil to imagine new affective entanglements yet to 
come. Cf. Puig de la Bellacasa, “Encountering Bioinfrastructure,” 35.  
111 Gaston Bachelard, Earth and Reveries: An Essay on the Imagination of 
Matter, trans. Kenneth Haltman (Dallas: Dallas Inst. Humanities & Culture, 2002), 
24.  
112 Robert Savage’s Afterword to Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, 
2010. (Cornell University Press, 2010), EBSCO Publishing: eBook Collection 81.  
113 Bernard Stiegler, “Automatic Society, Londres février 2015, Journal of Visual Art 
Practice 2016, 15 (2-3), 192-203, 192 
114 Cf. Stiegler, Automatic Society,” 199.  
115 Bernard Stiegler, “Automatic Society,” 192. 
116 Bernard Stiegler, “Automatic Society,” 199. 
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accelerated yet stunted temporality of 24/7 that diminishes and blocks interstitial 
time and place. As we intervene with the interface of soil, we need not to exclude 
new forms of technics. On the contrary, following Simondon and Stiegler, new 
prosthetics may be key to successful and more responsible interjections.  
Contemporary Danish-Icelandic artist Olafur Eliasson illustrates the 
possibility to intervene creatively with soil by making “quasi shapes” out of it, 
stacked up high like walls. His artwork Soil Quasi Bricks (2003) is made of fired 
compressed-soil tiles and wood.117 This quasi brick is “both irregular (at the ends) 
and regular (the hexagonal section) [which] gives any structure made of quasi brick 
a chaotic aspect, not seen, for instance, when stacking cubes.”118 Eliasson writes: 
“The overall shape changes according to how you stack the quasi bricks. So they’re 
quasi shapes, being always open to other ways of building with them. They 
incorporate time in a way.”119 In stacking the tiles, there is an element of 
“unpredictable production,” which ensures that the artwork is “only constituted in 
the mesh in which it’s entangled and exchanged.” It is this element of the non-
prescribed and non-predictable that Eliasson names “quasi.”120 While Eliasson does 
not address this directly, it is my view that by building these non-prescribed, 
regular-irregular artworks with soil, Eliasson adds an element of fragility, depth, 
and unique texture into his artworks, ensuring that temporality is even more visible 
as a “co-producer of the quasi-project.”121 
Eliasson’s artwork illustrates the possibility to engage soil through technics, 
incorporating soil in his quasi shapes to build walls consisting of both regular 
patterns as well as open, unpredictable, chaotic ways in which the soil bricks 
emerge. His artwork shows that careful engineering of the soil122 can be both 
 
117 The prototype for the brick is based on a study of the I5SSDO, “a 12-faced space-
filler built on the rhombic triacatahedron.” Olafur Eliasson, “Ólafur Elíasson, Anna 
Engberg-Pedersen, and Philip Ursprung,”in Studio Olafur Eliasson: An Encyclopedia 
(Köln: Taschen, 2016), 335. 
118 Olafur Eliasson, “Ólafur Elíasson, Anna Engberg-Pedersen, and Philip 
Ursprung,”in Studio Olafur Eliasson: An Encyclopedia. (Köln: Taschen, 2016), 335. 
For images also see: ; http://olafureliasson.net/archive/artwork/WEK100991/soil-
quasi-bricks, accessed June 3, 2018  
119 Eliasson, Studio Olafur Eliasson: An Encyclopedia, 334.  
120 Eliasson, Studio Olafur Eliasson: An Encyclopedia, 333.  
121Eliasson, Studio Olafur Eliasson: An Encyclopedia, 333.  
122 While I do see the danger of the concept of “affective engineering” within 
atmospheres of oppression as outlined by Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos in 
his article “Withdrawing from atmosphere,” I think that the kind of “affective 
engineering” that I plead for avoids such problems. Given the prominence of 
porosity in soil, and given the imagination it invokes, the affectivity I plead for 
eschews totalitarianism and oppression, and invokes coincidental emergences, 
solidarity, and innovation. Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Withdrawing 
from atmosphere: An ontology of air partitioning and affective engineering,” in 




responsive to the place and temporality of soil, and evocative of a new e-co-affective 
regime to come. To counter the “numbing” of existence and what Stiegler calls the 
affective proletarianization that destroys attention,123 we would do well to engage 
the soil more responsibly yet creatively, pausing our lifestyle, and, following the root 
of the word “attention,” encounter a sense of being “stretched” and “waiting.”124 
Accordingly, we may reclaim “a sensitivity or responsiveness to both internal and 
external sensation” and non-metric durations,125 thus allowing for long-term visions 
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